Committee on Homeland Security †Free Samples to Students

Question: Discuss about the Committee on Homeland Security. Answer: Introduction Failures in civil engineering works and related structures have culminated into serious destruction of property and massive loss of lives and are a phenomenon that still lives with us[1]. Just like any other professional fields, civil engineering is not left behind in experiencing failures of systems. In as much as civil engineering does not give a lot of room for errors besides the best efforts of its professionals, it still experiences errors that lead to loss of billions of dollars by the government and individuals resulting from destruction of property. In the design of any engineering structures, special and utmost attention should be given to the determination of the greatest magnitude of any given form of load that can successfully be applied to a structure without the structure failing[2]. In so doing it would be possible to estimate the safety factor against the failure. By 2005, reports indicated there were numerous floodwalls and levees failures that protected New Orleans and its surrounding resulting from the passage of Hurricane Katrina[3]. The New Orleans levee system project was designed and constructed by the United States Army Corps of Engineers while the maintenance was done by the local levee boards. Upon completion of the construction, the Corps handed over the project to the local levee board. The project was 90% completed at the time it started experiencing failures. Investigations were done by a team of experts that mainly consisted of civil engineers to establish the root cause of the failure[4]. All the investigators came to a consensus that the failure resulted from inadequate design and construction of the floodwalls and levee system by the Corps of Engineers. The engineers were found to have breached a number of term and conditions as outlined in the Orleans Parish[5]. Improper design of the canal floodwalls at London Avenue Canal, 17th Street Canal and Industrial Canal( located on the east side north) was the primary cause of the failure of these canals.[1] Overtopping of floodwalls and levees by the surge of the storm was the failure mechanism of for the Industrial Canal while 10% of sand in place of thick Louisiana clay for the levees that protected the New Orleans of the east was the primary cause of failure on this end. Negligent maintenance of the Gulf Outlet of River Mississippi resulted into overtopping of the levees that protected St. Bernard Parish hence resulting into failure[2]. Flooding of the Gentility neighborhood and the Lakeview neighborhood were also as a result of oversights from the Corps Engineers who were responsible for the design and construction of the levees and floodwalls. The team of engineers had two oversights. One of the oversights was an overestimation of the strength of soil during the design of the l-walls and the canal levees[5]. This meant that the strength of the soil that was used in the calculations of the design was higher than the strength that really existed near and under the levee at the time of Hurricane Katrina. This resulted in a destructive data interpretation since the soil that was underneath the levee was weaker than that which was applied in the design of the l-walls[7]. Failure to consider the chances of a gap filled with water in the design of the 17th Street Canal was yet another critical engineering oversight[6]. The gap filled with water emerged to be one of the fundamental causes of the failure of the canal. From research and analysis it was found that with the water-filled gap in place, the safety factor was reduced by approximately 30 percent. Having used a safety factor of 1.3 in the design and a decrease by 30 percent, then the safety factor would reduce to almost one which is basically a recipe for complete failure. The engineers misjudged the peat strength which was from the swamp remains on which some parts of the New Orleans were constructed. Borings of soil indicated that peat layer started at around 9.1 m under the surface and ranged from approximately 1.5 m to 6.1 m in thickness[7]. The peat had very high water content and very low shear strength from the investigations that were carried out. As a result of the weak strength of the soil, the floodwall became very susceptible and vulnerable to the stresses that were caused by the large flood. The movement of water through the underneath soil and as the pressure of the water built up, the moving water overpowered the strength of the soil hence a sudden shift and carrying with it all the materials including the wall[5]. The Hurricane Katrina Levee and floodwalls failure resulted in 1118 losses of lives and 135 other people reported missing. Residential property worth $21 billion was damaged and the government had to undertake another $6.7 billion for the repair and maintenance of public infrastructure that was as well destroyed. Over 124000 people lost their jobs: employees who were either directly or indirectly employed to work on the in the structure[6]. Conclusion Complex technical issues must be taken into account when a civil engineering project fails as a result of structural disasters. This should be done with utmost concern given to life and safety[3]. The failure of Hurricane Katrina levees and floodwalls was purely a responsibility of the United States Army Corps of Engineers. It is for this note that it is important for civil engineers to ensure no room is left for any errors be it in the design or construction stages. While most of the failures in civil engineering would be demotivating at the first glance, they are finally used as an inspiration that initiates improvements in future designs and construction. From the failures, engineers get a clue on what needs to be improved in order to generate safe structures. The errors made in the previous projects are used as the baseline of improvement aimed at enhancing and improving the safety of both human beings and their property. Determination of the factor of safety in any structure on the verge of failure is fundamental in any design and construction of engineering structures. References Tiffany E. Adams, Stability of Levees and Floodwalls Supported by Deep-mixed Shear Walls: Five Case Studies in the New Orleans Area, 4th ed., Tiffany E. Adams, Ed. Chicago, USA: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2015, pp 184-194. Committee on Environment and Public Works, Evaluate the degree to which the preliminary findings on the failure of the levees are being incorporated into the restoration of hurricane protection: hearing before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, United States Senate, One Hundred Ninth C, 1st ed., Committee on Environment and Public Works, Ed. Washington, USA: U.S. G.P.O, 2012, pp 156-198. Sandra L. Dwyer, Critical Thinking: The Art of Argument, 2nd ed., Sandra L. Dwyer, Ed. London, UK: Cengage Learning, 2014, pp 568-569. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared : Special Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Together with Additional Views, 3rd ed., Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ed. Washington, USA: Government Printing Office, 2016, pp 896-1005. United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared : Special Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Together with Additional Views, United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ed. New York, USA: Government Printing Office, 2010, pp 958-968. United States. Army. Corps of Engineers, Inner Harbor Navigation Canal Lock Replacement Project, Orleans Parish: Environmental Impact Statement, Volume 6, 4th ed., United States. Army. Corps of Engineers, Ed. New York, USA: United States. Army. Corps of Engineers, 2011, pp 129-135. Adams Teffer, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee To Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, February 15, 2006, 6th ed., Adams Teffer, Ed. London, UK: Government Printing Office, 2013, pp 661-700. Newton-Matza, Floodplain Management in the United States: An Assessment Report : Volume 1 Summary, 3rd ed., Newton-Matza, Ed. New Delhi, Australia: Floodplain Management in the United States: An Assessment Report : Volume 1 Summary, 2012, pp 236-258.